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SCOPE OF DISCLOSURE OF INTERNAL REVENUE
COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION FILES UNDER
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
Recent decisions1 applying the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA)2 to various administrative and policy materials and infor-
mation files of the Internal Revenue Service have eroded the pre-
viously privileged status of many IRS documents.3 The FOIA
mandates disclosure of federal agency records to "any person"
upon request, 4 and further requires that certain materials be pub-
lished in the Federal Register 5 and that certain others be made
See, e.g., Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974), affg 362
F. Supp. 1298 (D.D.C. 1973); Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972); Long v. IRS,
349 F. Supp. 871 (W.D.Wash. 1972), discussed in text accompanying notes 31, 51, and 52
infra.
2 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1967). Portions of the FOIA were amended in November, 1974 (Pub. L.
No. 93-502 (Nov. 21, 1974)), following recent Congressional investigations into secrecy in
government and problems in the administration of the Act. See generally Executive
Privilege, Secrecy in Government, Freedom of Information, Hearings before the Senate
Committee on Government Operation and the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Vols. 1-111
(1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings]. For legislative history of the 1974 amendment,
see H.R. REP. No. 93-876, 93d Cong. 1st Sess., reprinted 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6203-12 [hereinafter cited as 1974 H. REP.]; S. CONFERENCE REP. No.
93-1200, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted id. 6221-29 [hereinafter cited as 1974 S. REP.].
See notes 17-23 and accompanying text infra.
Prior to the 1974 amendment, § (a) (3) of the FOIA provided in part:
Except with respect to the records made available under [§ 552(a) (1) and (2)],
each agency, on request for identifiable records made in accordance with
published rules stating the time, place, fees to the extent authorized by statute,
and procedure to be followed, shall make the records promptly available to
any person.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1967) (emphasis added). The amendment substituted the following
language:
Except with respect to the records made available under [§ 552(a)(I) and (2)],
each agency, upon any request for records which (A) reasonably describes
such records and (B) is made in accordance with published rules stating the
time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall make the re-
cords promptly available to any person.
Pub. L. No. 93-502, § (b) (1) (Nov. 21, 1974), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1967)
(emphasis added). For a discussion of this change, see note 72 and accompanying text
infra.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1967) provides in part:
Each agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal Regis-
ter for the guidance of the public-
(A) descriptions of its central and field organizations and the established
places at which, the employees (and in the case of a uniformed service, the
members) from whom, and the methods whereby, the public may obtain in-
formation, make submittals or requests, or obtain decisions;
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available for public inspection and copying,6 unless the records or
materials fall within one of nine specified exemption provisions.7
(B) statements of the general course and method by which its functions are
channeled and determined, including the nature and requirements of all formal
and informal procedures available;
(C) rules of procedure, descriptions of forms available or the places at which
forms may be obtained, and instructions as to the scope and contents of all
papers, reports, or examinations;
(D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by law,
and statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability
formulated and adopted by the agency; and
(E) each amendment, revision, or repeal of the foregoing.
6 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1967) provides in part:
Each agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make available for
public inspection and copying-
(A) final opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, as well as
orders, made in the adjudication of cases;
(B) those statements of policy and interpretations which have been adopted
by the agency and are not published in the Federal Register; and
(C) administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a
member of the public, unless the materials are promptly published and the
copies offered for sale.
Prior to the 1974 amendment, § (b) of the FOIA stated that:
This section does not apply to matters that are -
(1) specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest
of the national defense or foreign policy;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the
extent available by law to a party other than an agency;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports
prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the
regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, con-
cerning wells.
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (1967). Two exemptions were rewritten by the 1974 amendment. The
following language replaced § (b)(l):
(1)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order
to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are
in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.
Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2(a) (Nov. 21, 1974), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1967). For cases
construing the statute prior to the amendment, see note 87 infra. Section (b)(7) was replaced
by the following provision:
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only
to the extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with
enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an
impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a
record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a
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The IRS is a federal agency within the meaning of the Act. 8 How-
ever, the boundaries of disclosure of IRS files and materials under
the Act remain under dispute.
This article will discuss the proper scope of disclosure under the
Freedom of Information Act of the files and administrative and
policy materials of the IRS, with particular attention to the follow-
ing currently contested issues: (1) the extent to which IRS
guideline documents and private letter rulings 9 are subject to dis-
closure; (2) the proper scope of the FOIA exemption for "inter-
agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not
be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with
the agency" 10 as applied to the IRS; and (3) the scope of the
exemption for "investigatory records compiled for law enforce-
ment purposes" 1 as applied to the IRS.
I. BACKGROUND
Each federal agency has adopted its own interpretation of the
FOIA in applying the Act to its operations. 12 The broad language
of the statute and the disparities between the final Senate commit-
criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security
intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only by the
confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or
(F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel.
Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2(b) (Nov. 21, 1974), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1967). See part
III C 6 infra. The following new provision was added to § (b):
Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person
requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under
this subsection.
Pub. L. No. 93-502,'§ 2(c) (Nov. 21, 1974), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1967). For cases
construing the statute prior to the amendment, see notes 109, 110 infra.
8 Attorney General's Memorandum on the Public Information Section of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, June 1967, reprinted 20 AD. L. REV. 263, 270-71 (1968). The 1974
amendment further enlarged the definition of "agency" under the FOIA. Pub. L. No.
93-502, § 3(e) (Nov. 21, 1974), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1967). See 1974 H. REP. at 6210;
1974 S. REP. at 6229.
9 Private letter rulings are letters written to taxpayers in response to their request for an
opinion on the tax effect of a specific transaction. Private rulings are of two types: "letter
rulings" issued by the Office of the Assistant Commissioner (Technical) in Washington,
which treat novel cases, and "determination letters" issued by a district director, applying
previously announced interpretations. Only about 600 of the approximately 26,000 letter
rulings issued each year are published in the Internal Revenue Bulletins. See generally J.
CHOMMIE, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION 862-66 (2d Ed. 1973).
10 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1967) .
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1967), as amended Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2(b) (Nov. 21, 1974).
12 Nader, Freedom from Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5 HARV. CIV.
RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. I, 4 (1969).
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tee report 13  and the final House committee report 14  left
many problems of interpretation, 15 several of which directly con-
cern the IRS. 16
After enactment of the FOIA in 1966, spokesmen for the IRS
construed its provisions narrowly, relying on qualifying language in
the House report not present in the Senate report.17 Only limited
changes were made in the Service's disclosure policy. The regula-
tions implementing the FOIA'8 provided for inspection upon re-
quest of one type of record not previously available. 19 Final ad-
judications in alcohol and tobacco cases were added to those ma-
terials which were already being published in the Federal
Register. 20 A heavily-edited version of the Internal Revenue Man-
ual was placed in IRS reading rooms. 21 However, the IRS con-
tended from the outset that its private letter rulings, "manuals,
handbooks, policy statements, and instructions [to staff]," internal
communications, and materials both factual and interpretative in
its files on taxpayers were privileged. 22 This followed in the long-
13 S. REP. No. 89-813, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 S. REP.].
14 H. R. REP. No. 89-1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 H.
REP.].
15 Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 762
(1967).
16 Among these issues were: whether private letter rulings are "interpretations which
have been adopted by the agency" within the meaning of the FOIA, id. at 773-74; whether
"interpretations" include decisions to investigate, litigate, or settle, id. at 777; whether IRS
audit guidelines are "staff manuals and instructions" within the meaning of the FOIA, id. at
779; what are "internal personnel rules and practices," id. at 785-86; and the scope of the
exemptions for "inter-agency memorandums" and for "investigatory files," id. at 794.
'7 Uretz, Freedom of Information and the IRS, 20 ARK. L. REV. 283 (1967); Uretz,
Remarks before the A.B.A. Section of Taxation, Honolulu, Hawaii, August, 1967, 2 1(])
TAX LAWYER 17 (1967); Panel Discussion on Freedom of Information Act, 20(3) TAX
LAWYER 43 (1967).
18 26 C.F.R. §§ 601.601, 601.701 - 601.702 (1974). For the procedure the IRS is to follow
upon a request for disclosure, see 26 C.F.R. § 301.9000-1 (1974).
19 Comments submitted on or after August 2, 1967, on proposed regulations, except as to
any comment or portion which the submitter specifically requests be treated as confidential.
26 C.F.R. § 601.601(b) (1974).
20 Schmidt, Freedom of Information Act and the Internal Revenue Service, 20 So. CAL.
TAX INST. 79, 87 (1968). This article describes procedures the IRS adopted for disclosure of
information under the FOIA and lists IRS materials published in the Federal Register and
otherwise routinely made available to the public under the Act.
21 Sobeloff, The New Freedom of Information Act: What It Means to Tax Practitioners,
27 J. TAXATION 130, 130 (1967). See also note 42 infra.
22 Uretz, Freedom of Information and the IRS, 20 ARK. L. REV. 283, 287 (1967).
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standing tradition of IRS resistance to forced disclosure. 23 Overall,
the FOIA had little immediate effect on the extent of IRS disclo-
sure to the public.
Tax law practitioners and commentators disagreed with the IRS
position but recognized that the interpretative problems with the
FOIA referred to above made it difficult to determine the Act's
applicability to the materials which the IRS protected.2 4 Litigation
inevitably followed. 25 IRS reluctance to make materials available
under the FOIA drew strong criticism from the House subcommit-
tee which investigated the administration of the Act by the federal
bureaucracy in 1972.26 The authority of the original House
report,2 7 on which the IRS had based its interpretation, has been
23 IRS claims of privilege antedate even the present income tax. For example, an early
Internal Revenue regulation required collectors of federal revenues not to disclose their files
to anyone. A Kentucky state court ordered an excise tax collector jailed for contempt for
refusing to disclose information concerning bonded whiskey, which Kentucky wanted to
subject to a property tax. The Supreme Court upheld the regulation under a statute (re-
pealed in 1958) which stated that heads of departments could make regulations for the
"custody, care and preservation of their records." Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459
(1900).
24 Emanuel, Using the Freedom of Information Act in Tax Cases, P-H TAX IDEAS
28,017, 28,017.5 (1970); Adams, The Freedom of Information Act and Pretrial Discovery,
43 MILITARY L. REV. I (1969); B. Eaton & M. Lynch, Tax Practice as Affected by the
Freedom of Information Act and the Information Retrieval System, in DEFENDING TAX
FRAUD PROSECUTIONS 216 (1969); Sexton, New Law Changes Rules on What Information
IRS Must Disclose; Confusion Likely, 26(2) TAXATION 120 (1967); Note, The Federal
Freedom of Information Act as an Aid to Discovery, 54 IOWA L. REV. 141 (1968).
25 As one district court remarked:
Based upon the number of reported decisions ... the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice presently holds the track record as the most reluctant bureaucratic dragon
in its claims of confidentiality, but other agencies are making a yeoman's effort
to catch up.
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Los Alamos Constructors, Inc., 382 F. Supp.
1373, 1376 (D.N.M. 1974).
26 H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 H.
REP.]:
Testimony by Mr. Donald 0. Virdin, Chief, Disclosure Staff, Office of the
Assistant Commission (Compliance), Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and that
of Mrs. Charlotte T. Lloyd, Assistant General Counsel, Treasury Depart-
ment covered some of the most serious cases of bureaucratic abuses uncov-
ered during the subcommittee's investigation of the administration of the
Freedom of Information Act. ...
The list provided by IRS for the hearing record which summarizes the types
of requests received under the FOI Act since July 1967, is a revealing insight
into the impact which the act has on day-to-day activities of a Federal agency.
Almost half of the requests to IRS were denied. In addition, many of the
requests recorded in the list were for copies of printed handbooks or manuals
available in the public reading room, so that the denial record on substantive
requests under the act is even higher than the percentages show (citations
omitted).
217 Cf. notes 13-16 and accompanying text supra.
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rejected in the courts.2 8 The Attorney General's Memorandum
interpreting the FOIA, 29 which had favored the House report and
which supported the IRS position, was criticized as overly restric-
tive by the investigating subcommittee. 30 As yet, however, no
definitive standards for availability of IRS materials have been
offered.
II. KEY RECENT DECISIONS
The blanket protection originally invoked by the IRS under the
FOIA has been partially removed by the courts. Strong attacks
have been made on the nondisclosure of unpublished private letter
rulings and the Internal Revenue Manual.
A. Private Letter Rulings
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
District Court's determination in Tax Analysts and Advocates v.
Internal Revenue Service 31 that unpublished private letter rulings
are "interpretations" of tax law adopted by the IRS, within the
meaning of the FOIA, 32 which must be made available to the pub-
lic. The lower court holding, which is fully discussed in the
literature,33 extended availability to technical advice memoran-
dums as well. 34 The Court of Appeals refused to compel produc-
tion of the latter on the ground that, since the memorandums deal
with individual tax returns, they are protected by statutes prevent-
ing disclosure of information on returns. 35 The District Court held
28 The House report was published after the Senate had passed its version of the FOIA,
which was enacted intact by the House. Since only the Senate report was considered by
both Houses of Congress, the Senate report is the better indicator of legislative intent when
the two reports conflict. Benson v. General Services Administration, 289 F. Supp. 590, 595
(W. D. Wash. 1968), affd 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969);Consumers Union of the United
States v. Veterans Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796,801 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed
436 F. 2nd 1363 (2d Cir. 1971); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 3A.2,
116-117 (Supp. 1970). The origins of the more restrictive provisions of the House report lie
in the questionable attempt by the House Government Operations Committee to water
down the FOIA, to avoid a threatened Presidential veto, without altering the language of the
bill as passed by the Senate. Statement of Benny Kass, Attorney at Law, in Executive
Privilege, Secrecy in Government, Freedom of Information, 1973 Hearings, vol. 2, 122-29.
(1973).
2'9 See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
30 1972 H. REP. at 64-65.
31 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974), affg 362 F. Supp. 1298 (D.D.C. 1973).
32 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(B) (1967).
33 Note, 1974 Wisc. L. REV. 227; Note, 7 INDIANA L. REV. 416 (1973).
3' 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1310. Technical advice memorandums are responses frpm Washing-
ton to requests submitted by a district director for resolution of issues raised by audited tax
returns.
3- 505 F:2d 350, 354.
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that private letter rulings were not exempted from disclosure as
"trade secrets and confidential financial information,''36 or "mat-
ters specifically exempted from disclosure by statute, ' 37 or
"intra-agency memorandums." ' 38 Both courts found that nondis-
closure of letter rulings created a secret body of law to which
taxpayers did not have equal access. 39 The public policy behind
the FOIA-the prevention of the development of secret federal
agency law-required that agency interpretations of law be
disclosed.40
In its appeal the IRS did not contest either the finding that pri-
vate letter rulings and technical advice memoranda are adopted
interpretations of law within the meaning of the FOIA or the
finding that the exemptions for inter-agency memorandums and for
trade secrets and confidential financial information do not bar their
disclosure.41 The Service appealed the finding that letter rulings
and technical advice memorandums were not "specifically ex-
empted from disclosure by statute, ' 42 citing two statutes protect-
ing the confidentiality of tax returns, 43 and sought the protection of
the court's equitable powers. 44 The Court of Appeals disclaimed
11 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1307, interpreting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1967). The Court of Appeals
disagreed with this finding. 505 F.2d 350, 355 (dictum).
" 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1308, interpreting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1967); accord, 505 F.2d
350, 354.
38 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1308-09, interpreting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1967).
39 The IRS argument that letter rulings are not interpretations because they are not
precedent was unequivocally rejected by the District Court:
It matters not that the interpretation is never again cited or relied upon by the
agency or anyone else, for this cannot obliterate the fact that the interpretation
was once adopted by the agency and thereby came within the express terms of
the Freedom of Information Act.
362 F. Supp. 1298, 1303. The Court of Appeals agreed, stating that:
It is well established that information which either creates or provides a way of
determining the extent of substantive rights and liabilities constitutes a form of
law that cannot be withheld from the public.
505 F.2d 350, 353. For a discussion of unequal access to IRS rulings and the policy reasons
favoring private letter disclosure, see Ried, Public Access to Internal Revenue Service
Rulings, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 23 (1972); Note, Public Disclosure of Private Letter
Rulings, 40 U. CHi. L. REV. 832 (1973).
"1 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1310. See Sterling Drug Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 708 (D.C. Cir.
1971) and 1965 S. REP. at 10.
41 505 F.2d 350, 352-53. The court questioned the IRS decision not to appeal the adverse
ruling on the trade secrets and "commercial or financial information" exemption. 505 F.2d
350, 355. But the exemption is of limited protective value to IRS documents. See Part III C
3 infra.
42 505 F.2d 350, 352.
43 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a)(1) (1970); 26 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(1) (1970).
44 505 F.2d 350, 352.
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any powers under the FOIA to refuse disclosure on equitable
grounds,45 and held that private letter rulings are not exempt from
disclosure by statute, since a letter ruling is not part of a tax
return.46  By announcing that it will require waivers of
confidentiality from those seeking private letter rulings in the
future,47 the IRS has indicated that it will not appeal the Court of
Appeals ruling.
B. Internal Revenue Manual
A portion of the Internal Revenue Manual48 was made public
soon after the effective date of the FOIA.4 9 Other portions of the
Manual have been released voluntarily by the IRS, either pursuant
to litigation (as evidence) or upon requests under the FOIA. 50
Federal courts have upheld demands pursuant to the FOIA for
production of specific unreleased portions of the Manual in Long v.
Internal Revenue Service51 and in Hawkes v. Internal Revenue
Service. 52 Courts in both cases ruled that the Manual constitutes an
"administrative staff manual" within the meaning of the Act.5 3 In
Hawkes, the court held that the exemption for "internal personnel
rules and practices ' 5 4 was inapplicable to the Manual, reasoning
that the exemption should be construed as pertaining to employer-
employee relations. 55 The Long court rejected both the claim that
the Manual was exempt as an "intra-agency memorandum ' 56 and
the contention that the Manual constituted "internal personnel
45 505 F.2d 350, 355.
46 505 F.2d 350, 354-55.
41 P-H 1974 FEDERAL TAXES REPORT BULLETIN 60, 410.
4 The manual was described by a federal court as follows:
The Manual guides agents in negotiating with the public and promotes uniform-
ity by detailing information and instructions pertaining to the processing and
technical aspects involved in the drafting, processing, reviewing, and signing
of closing agreements ...
Long v. IRS, 349 F. Supp. 871, 874 (W.D. Wash. 1972).
'9 See Soboloff, supra note 21, at 130.
"I Long v. IRS, 349 F. Supp. 871, 874 n;18 (W.D. Wash. 1972).
51 349 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Wash. 1972). See also 1972 H. REP. at 23 (congressional
criticism of IRS withholding of documents requested in this case).
52 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972).
11 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (C) (1967).
54 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1967).
55 467 F.2d 787, 796. See notes 92-94 and accompanying text infra.
56 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1967).
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rules and practices," emphasizing the FOIA's guarantee of the
public's right of access to federal agency procedures affecting
members of the public. 57 According to the court, any prejudice to
the government was outweighed by the public's right to have ac-
cess to these procedures. 58
The Long and Hawkes decisions freed specified portions of the
Manual only. These cases establish that Manual portions
specifiable by the seeker are subject to disclosure upon request.
But the FOIA requires that agencies make administrative staff
manuals available for public inspection and copying. 59 This re-
quirement extends to "interpretations" adopted by an agency as
well, 60 and therefore also applies to previously unpublished private
letter rulings. 61 The FOIA also requires the publication and dis-
tribution of current indexes to all staff manuals, instructions to
staff that affect the public, and adopted interpretations of law, from
1967 forward, unless such publication would be unnecessary and
impracticable. 62
III. APPLYING THE FOIA
Prior to the decisions in Tax Analysts, Long, and Hawkes, it was
apparent that the FOIA would have to be given a broader scope
than that provided by the original IRS interpretation if it were to
achieve meaningful disclosure for taxpayers.63 The results in these
cases, and the criticisms of the IRS position discussed above, 64
strongly suggest that reinterpretation is warranted. The decisions
applying the FOIA to other federal agencies, and to the IRS, pro-
vide a detailed and reliable outline for such a reinterpretation.
A. FOIA Status of IRS Materials
For required disclosure under the FOIA, Internal Revenue files
and materials must fall within one of the three subdivisions of § (a)
5' 349 F. Supp. 871, 874.
" 349 F. Supp. 871, 875.
-59 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(2)(C) (1967).
60 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(2)(B) (1967).
61 See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
Pub. L. No. 93-502, § (a) (Nov. 21, 1974), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1967). See
1974 S. REP. at 6222; 1974 H. REP. at 6205.
63 Comment, Taxpayers Discovery in Civil Federal Tax Controversies, 51 NEB. L.
REV. 290. 301 (1971).
64 See notes 24-28 and accompanying text supra.
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(2) of the Act 65 or constitute records within themeaningof § (a)(3).66 Although the Hawkes and Long courts upheld requests for
production of certain materials in addition to the specified portions
of the Manual, 67 neither court expressly identified such materials
as "administrative staff manuals" under § (a) (2) (C). Subsection
(a) (2) (B) "interpretations" have to date been held to apply to
private letter rulings but not to technical advice memorandums. 68
However, it is arguable that these classifications also apply to any
similar IRS documents which offer guidelines or instruction to staff
in administering tax laws, or which apply or interpret tax law. If
materials do not fall within § (a) (2) classifications, they are disclos-
able as "records" under § (a) (3), in any case, unless an exemption
provision applies. 69 The FOIA in effect creates a liberal disclosure
requirement subject only to the nine stated exemptions. 70
B. Procedure
Requests for information or documents must comply with cer-
tain procedural requirements. Prior to the 1974 amendment, a
seeker of IRS materials needed to name the particular documents
sought; requests for all materials on a specific issue were denied as
too broad.7 1 A seeker under present law need only supply a
65 The subdivisions are: § (a)(2)(A) final opinions or orders made in the adjudication of
cases; § (a)(2)(B) statements of policy and interpretations adopted by an agency; and §
(a)(2)(C) administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a member of the
public. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1967).
66 Pub. L. No. 93-502, § (b)(1) (Nov. 21, 1974), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1967).
67 349 F. Supp. 870, 873 (Management Information Report, Source of Returns-income
Taxes. Document #5342); 467 F.2d 787, 789 (copies of Forms 899 and 4340 recording
assessment and payment of Hawkes' federal income taxes; copies of IRS documents per-
taining to an audit of Hawkes' taxes). Certain materials were denied to the Longs in earlier
proceedings. Long v. IRS, 339 F. Supp. 1266 (1972). (W. D. Wash. 1971).
6" See text accompanying note 31 supra.
69 1965 S. REP. at 10:
The purpose of this subsection [§ (a)] is to make it clear beyond doubt that all
materials of the Government are to be made available to the public by publica-
tion or otherwise unless explicitly allowed to be kept secret by one of the
exemptions in [§ (b)].
The House report is substantially identical. 1965 H. REP. at 11.
70 Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974);
Bristol-Myers v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824
(1970).
71 Robins & Weill v. United States, 63 F.R.D. 73, 77 (D.N.C. 1974) (guideline and
decisional materials); Shakespeare Co. v. United States, 389 F.2d 772, 776 (Ct.CI. 1968),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 820 (private letter rulings); See generally Irons v. Schuyler, 465 F. 2d
608 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972).
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"reasonable description" enabling the agency to identify and lo-
cate the materials sought. 72 Seekers of materials must exhaust IRS
administrative procedures before. production will be compelled by
the district courts. 73 A court may not use equitable powers, rather
than a stated FOIA exemption, to deny production of requested
IRS materials.7 4 District court orders to produce information pur-
suant to the FOIA are appealable by the interested agency. 75
Since the United States Tax Court lacks rules permitting the
type of discovery which may be carried out in the district courts or
in the United States Court of Claims,7 6 the FOIA is a potentially
valuable collateral method of discovery for use in tax litigation. In
general, a discoverant may elect to use either the FOIA, or the
discovery tools of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 7 as suits
his tactics. But questions of propriety arise when the discoverant
proceeds with civil discovery while also suing under the FOIA. 78
The 1974 amendment to the FOIA 79 granted important pro-
cedural rights to information seekers. Fees for document search
and duplication are limited to the reasonable direct cost of these
services.80 Agencies must serve answers to complaints in FOIA
suits within thirty days.81 A successful complainant may recover
72 Pub. L. No. 93-502, § (b)(1) (Nov. 21, 1974), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (1967). See
note 4 supra. The House report states that the amendment
is designed to insure that a requirement for a specific title or file number cannot
be the only requirement of an agency for the identification of documents. A
description of a requested document would be sufficient if it enabled a profes-
sional employee of the agency who was familiar with the subject area of the
request to locate the record with a reasonable amount of effort.
1974 H. REP. at 6207. The Senate Conference report declares that this was all that was
required under the original language as well. 1974 S REP. at 6222.
7" Etheridge v. IRS, 33 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 74-1037 (N.D. Ga. 1974). See Attorney
General's Memorandum, supra note 8, at 28-29.
11 Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 505 F.2d 350, 355 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See 1965 S.
REP. at 3; 1972 H.REP., at 77; Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1971), stay
denied, 404 U.S. 1204 (1971); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Wellford v. Hardin 444 F.2d 21, 23-24 (4th Cir. 1971). But see Tennessean Newspapers v.
FHA, 464 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1972) (concurring opinion) and Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787,
797 (6th Cir. 1972) (opinion dissenting in part).
'5 Theriault v. United States, 503 F.2d 390, 391 (9th Cir. 1974).
7" See Comment, Taxpayers Discovery in Civil Federal Tax Controversies, 51 NEB. L.
REV. 290, 302-17 (1971).
77 FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
71 Compare Williams v. IRS, 345 F. Supp. 591, 594 (D. Del. 1972), aff d, 479 F.2d 317 (3d
Cir. 1973) (forbidding simultaneous requests), with Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787, 792-93
(6th Cir. 1972) (permitting simultaneous requests). See also National Cable Television
Ass'n v. FCC, 479 F.2d 183, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
19 Pub. L. No. 93-502 (Nov. 21, 1974),amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(1967). See note 2supra.
" Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 4(A) (Nov. 21, 1974). See 1974 S. REP. at 6222-23.
81 Id., § 4(C). See 1974 H. REP. at 6207-08; 1974 S. REP. at 6224. Section 4(D) gives
FOIA suits precedence in district court dockets and courts of appeal. See 1974 S. REP. at
6224.
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reasonable attorney fees and costs of FOIA litigation.8 2 Arbitrary
or capricious withholding of materials is subject to disciplinary
action.8 3  Under normal circumstances, agencies must act on
FOIA requests within ten working days. 84
C. The Proper Scope of the FOIA Exemptions
as Applied to the IRS
The IRS has used most of the nine exemption provisions of the
FOIA to deny requests for documents. Of these nine, the exemp-
tions for reports of agencies which regulate financial institutions 85
and for geological information concerning wells 86 are clearly inap-
plicable to the IRS. The exemption for materjals classed as secret
by executive order for national security reasons would rarely apply
to materials in IRS possession.87
1. Internal personnel rules and practices -Relying on a broad
interpretation of the provision found only in the House report, 88
the IRS has claimed that the exemption for internal personnel rules
and practices 9 shields its manuals and other guideline
documents. 90 The Hawkes and Long courts, however, rejected
this interpretation.9 1 Both decisions followed the orthodox view,
adopted by federal courts from language in the Senate report, 92
that the exemption pertains to employer-employee relations, not
guidelines for staff in executing their assignments. 93 Material sub-
2 Id., § 4(E). See 1974 H. REP. at 6208; 1974 S. REP. at 6224.
83 Id., § 4(F). See 1974 S. REP. at 6224-25.
84 Id., § 6(A). See 1974 H. REP. at 6207-08; 1974 S. REP. at 6225-26.
8- 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(8) (1967).
86 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(9) (1967).
87 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1967), amended Pub. L. No. 93-502 § 2(a) (Nov. 21, 1967). For
cases applying thisexemption prior to the 1974 amendment, see EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73
(1973, and Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
For 1974 amendments see note 7 supra; 1974 S. REP. at 6226; 1974 H. REP. at 6209.
8' 1965 H. REP. at 10; contra, 1965 S. REP. at 8.
89 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1967).
90 Uretz, Freedom of Information and the IRS, supra note 17, at 287.
91 Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787, 796 (6th Cir. 1972); Long v. IRS, 349 F. Supp. 871, 874
(W.D. Wash. 1972).
92 The Senate report gives these examples of "personnel rules":
[E]mployee use of employer's plant and equipment, and amount of time in
each working day which is to be devoted to the employer's business and
activity [and] rules as to personnel's use of parking facilities or regulation of
lunch hours, statements of policy as to sick leave, and the like.
1965 S. REP. at 10.
93 Consumer's Union of United States v. Veteran's Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796,
801 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971); Benson v. General
Services Administration, 289 F. Supp. 590, 595 (W.D. Wash. 1968), affd on other grounds,
415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969). See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3A.17,
144-45 (Supp. 1970).
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ject to this exemption must be related solely to such matters in
order to fall within the exemption.9 4 Thus, this exemption blocks
access only to those IRS rules and regulations pertaining to
"housekeeping" and employee conduct.
2. Statutory exemptions-The FOIA provides that materials
previously or subsequently protected from disclosure by statute
remain protected.9 5 There is only limited controversy in this area.
The IRS regulations list statutes which may prevent disclosure of
some records. 96 In a case not involving Internal Revenue materi-
als, the federal statute making unauthorized release of confidential
information by a federal officer unlawful9 7 was held not to bar
disclosures pursuant to the FOIA. 98 Technical advice memoran-
dums, which discuss individual tax returns, may be protected99 by
the statutory prohibition against disclosure of information on tax
returns.100 However, a taxpayer's papers turned over to the IRS
are not exempt under this statute from the taxpayer's own request
for their return.101 In any case, this exemption merely preserves
statutory protections from implicit repeal by the FOIA; only the
previous limitations of such statutes restrict disclosure under the
FOIA. 102
3. Trade secrets and confidential financial information-The
FOIA exempts "trade secrets and commercial or financial infor-
mation obtained from a person and privileged or confidential" from
disclosure. 10 3 The IRS contention that this exemption applied to
any information given to the government in confidence was re-
jected by the district court in Tax Analysts, 104 in light of the settled
doctrine that this provision exempts only materials which are
either trade secrets or information obtained from a person outside
94 Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1973).
95 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1967).
96 26 C.F.R. § 601.701(b)(2) (1974). Prior statutes requiring and prohibiting disclosure
which apply to the IRS and were unaffected by the FOIA are listed in Schmidt, supra note
20, at 84. Some dealing with information on narcotics have been repealed, but information
on most tax returns remains protected. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 6103, 6104, 6105,
6106, and 6108.
97 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970).
9' Consumer's Union of United States v. Veteran's Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796,
801-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
9' See text accompanying notes 31-35 supra.100 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a)(1) (1970).
101 B & C Tire Co. v. IRS, 33 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 74-489 (N.D. Ala. 1974) (FOIA
request).
102 1965 H. REP. at 10.
103 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1967).
10' 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1307 (D.D.C. 1973), affd, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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the agency which is commercial or financial and privileged or
confidential. 1 5 A claim or promise of confidentiality by the agency
will not suffice.'0 6 The materials must be independently
confidential, based upon their contents, and entitled to a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy. 10 7 The Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit has adopted the test that commercial
or financial information is confidential for purposes of this exemp-
tion to the FOIA only if disclosure of the information will either
impair the government's ability to obtain necessary information in
the future or will cause substantial harm to the competitive position
of the person from whom the information was obtained.' 08 How-
ever, the exemption only operates if the information sought can not
be rendered confidential by deletion of names and other identifying
information ' " or portions of the materials."10 This judicially de-
veloped rule that materials which can be separated from exempt
documents or files must be disclosed has been incorporated into
the FOIA and applied to all nine exemptions."' IRS records are
therefore protected by this exemption only if it can be demon-
strated that they are both independently confidential and not capa-
ble of being rendered anonymous. 112
4. Invasion of personal privacy-A closely related exemption is
the one for "personnel and medical files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy."11 3 Except for information on the IRS's own employees,
Ill Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673(D.C. Cir. 1971), stay denied, 404 U.S. 1204
(1971); Consumer's Union of United States v. Veteran's Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796,
802 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). appeal dismissed, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
106 Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
824 (1970); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1971), stay denied, 404 U.S.
1204 (1971); Legal Aid Society v. Schultz, 349 F. Supp. 771, 776 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
107 Fischer v. Renegotiation Board, 473 F.2d 109, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Getman v.
NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1971), stay denied, 404 U.S. 1204 (1971); Grumman
Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Renegotiation Board, 425 F.2d 578, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
M.A. Shapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467, 471 (D.D.C. 1972).
108 National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
accord, Petkas v. Staats, 501 F.2d 887, 889 (D.C. Cir. 1974) and Pacific Architects &
Engineers, Inc. v. Renegotiation Board, 505 F.2d 383, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1974). But see 1965 S.
REP. at 9.
109 Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Renegotiation Board, 425 F.2d 578, 580
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Bristol-Myers v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 824 (1970).
110 National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. FCC, 479 F.2d 183, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
'11 Pub. L. No. 93-502 § (b) (Nov. 21, 1974). See note 7 supra; 1974 S. REP. at 6228.
112 Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1308 (D.D.C. 1973), affd, 505
F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974). But cf. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498
F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (announces subsequent additional criteria of confidentiality
under exemption (b)(4)).
113 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1967).
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sensitive information of this nature in the hands of the IRS is
statutorily protected.1 14 This exemption has been interpreted as
requiring a balancing of interests between rights of privacy from
unnecessary public scrutiny and the public's right to governmental
information.115 The type of information protected is "intimate de-
tails" of a "highly personal" nature. 116 In general, this protection
is not relevant to taxpayer requests for decisional or guideline
documents from the IRS. Both the purposes of this exemption and
of the exemption for confidential information may be served by
deletion of names and other identifying data from materials re-
leased by the IRS.
5. Intra-agency "memorandums"-The IRS has invoked the
FOIA exemption for "intra-agency memorandums or letters which
would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in
litigation with the agency ''117 against requests for its guideline
documents, manuals, and policy materials. 18 The potentially
broad terms of this exemption were intended only to protect gov-
ernmental personnel from routine disclosure of their exchanges of
opinion and recommendations.1 19 Two restrictions which narrow
and define the scope of this exemption have been developed by the
courts.
The most generally accepted restriction on the scope of the ex-
emption is that it does not apply to documents which contain fact,
rather than policy or recommendations for policy. 120 This exemp-
114 See note 96 and accompanying text supra.
115 Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133, 136 (3d Cir. 1974); Getman v. NLRB,
450 F.2d 670, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1971), stay denied, 404 U.S. 1204 (1971).
"' Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1971), stay denied, 404 U.S. 1204
(1971). See 1965 S. REP. at 9, 1965 H. REP. at I1. A recent decision has held that material
exempt from disclosure must be both a personnel or medical file and such that disclosure
would constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Robles v. EPA, 484
F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973).
117 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1967).
1' See notes 31, 51, 52 and accompanying text supra.
119 1965 S. REP. at 9; 1965 H. REP. at 10; Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336, 1341 (D.C. Cir.
1969). See Katz, Games Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 1261, 1274-75 (1970).
120 Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW, 504 F.2d 238, 249 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Bristol-Myers v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824
(1970); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. HUD, 343 F. Supp. 1176, 1178 (E.D. Pa. 1972);
M.A. Shapiro v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467, 470 (D.D.C. 1972); Talbott Construction Co. v.
United States,49 F.R.D. 68, 71 (E.D. Ky. 1969) (IRS documents); Verrazzano Trading v.
United States; 349 F. Supp. 1401, 1406 (Cust. Ct. 1972) (IRS documents).
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tion is interpreted as permitting production up to the limits imposed
by the Federal Rules of Discovery on litigants with the agen-
cies.121 Since factual material and investigative reports are
routinely subject to discovery, 122 courts have held that such mate-
rial is not covered by the intra-agency memorandums
exemption.1 2 3 Also, purely factual material which is separable
from the policy or recommendation portion of documents is subject
to disclosure under the FOIA. 12 4 Courts may apply the fact/policy
test by in-camera inspection and exclude policy portions of docu-
ments from production.1 2 5 The fact/policy test was applied to IRS
materials in both the Long1 2 6 and the Tax Analysts1 2 7 decisions.
The second limitation which courts have applied to the exemp-
tion for intra-agency memorandums is that statements of policy or
interpretations of law actually adopted by an agency and docu-
121 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b). The Supreme Court stated in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 86
(1973) that:
This language clearly contemplates that the public is entitled to all such
memoranda or letters that a private party could discover in litigation with the
agency.
122 Government documents containing legal analyses and recommendations may in some
circumstances be subject to discovery, but granting discovery of such documents is not a
routine matter. See, e.g., Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318
(D.D.C. 1966).
123 EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89 (1973) (dictum); Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v.
FHA, 464 F.2d 657, 660 (6th Cir. 1972); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 704-05
(D.C. Cir. 1971); General Services Administration v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 880 (9th Cir.
1969); Consumer's Union of United States v. Veteran's Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796,
805 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971). But cf. Wu v. Na-
tional Endowment for the Humanities, 460 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
926 (1973).
124 EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 91 (1973) (dictum); National Cable Television Ass'n v.
FCC, 479 F.2d 183, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 704
(D.C. Cir. 1971). This rule was explicitly incorporated into the FOIA by the 1974 amend-
ments. See notes 7, 11I supra.
125 National Cable Television Ass'n v. FCC, 479 F.2d 183, 194-95 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Stern
v. Richardson, 367 F. Supp. 1316, 1318 (D.D.C. 1973); Kreindler v. Department of the
Navy, 363 F. Supp. 611, 612-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Brown v. United States, 58 F.R.D. 599,
603 (D.S.C. 1973) (IRS documents); Simmons-Eastern v. United States, 55 F.R.D. 88, 89
(N.D. Ga. 1972) (IRS documents). In-camera inspection may be used to determine the
applicability of any FOIA exemption. Pub. L. No. 93-502 § l(b)(4)(B) (Nov. 21, 1974),
amending 5 U.S.C. § 551(a) (1967); 1974 S. REP. at 6223; 1974 H. REP. at 6228-29. In some
cases, master may be appointed to carry out the in-camera inspection. Frankel v. SEC, 336
F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972). The agency may be required to present a detailed justification
of claimed exemptions to enable proper in-camera review. Vaughn v. Rosen, 383 F. Supp.
1049, 1051 (D.D.C. 1974), on remand from 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 977 (1973); Pacific Architects & Engineers v. Renegotiation Board, 505 F.2d 383 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
126 349 F. Supp. 870, 874.
127 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1309.
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ments containing the basis and rationale for an agency's disposition
of particular cases are outside the scope of the exemption.1 28 This
interpretation, which reflects the FOIA policy of eliminating se-
cret law, 129 does not rest on previous law of federal discovery, but
upon the need to read the exemption compatibly with the FOIA
requirement that "statements of policy and interpretions' ' 130 and
"staff manuals or instructions to staff that affect" the public 131 be
disclosed.1 32 The Long court implicitly ruled that the Manual,
which it determined was a "staff manual" under the FOIA, was
not exempted as an intra-agency memorandum, despite the fact
that it contained rules for the disposition of cases rather than
fact.1 33
These restrictions have been further refined by recent decisions
in the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. In Grumman
Aircraft Engineering Corporation v. Renegotiation Board,134 the
court ruled that, since pre-decisional deliberations by agencies re-
quire the protection of privacy, materials composed exclusively
for purposes of policy formation are exempt from the FOIA, but
the court also found that those materials which reflect policy al-
ready made or communicated to the public are subject to
disclosure. 135 Entirely factual material which can be separated
from pre-decisional documents is also disclosable.136 In Montrose
Chemical Corporation of California v. Train137 the court further
developed the fact/policy test, holding that, since the intra-agency
memorandums exemption protects the deliberative process of an
agency, factual summaries prepared for an administrator by his
staff for his use in decisionmaking are exempt from disclosure.138
128 Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1971); American Mail Line
v. Gulick, 411 F.2d 696, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 346 F.
Supp. 751, 754 (D.D.C. 1972).
129 Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, §§ 3A.11, 3A.21 at 135-36, 159 (Supp. 1970).
130 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(B) (1967).
13,1 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(C) (1967).
132 Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1973); American Mail Line v.
Gulick, 411 F.2d 696, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 346 F. Supp.
751, 754 (D.D.C. 1972).
133 349 F. Supp. 870, 874.
13- 482 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 94 S.Ct. 2603 (1974).
135 482 F.2d at 719-20.
136 Id. at 720. See notes 109-11 supra.
,37 491 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1974); accord, Washington Research Project, Inc. v. HEW,
504 F.2d 238, 249 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Owens v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 379 F. Supp.
547 (D.D.C. 1974).
138 491 F.2d 63, 66-71.
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Nevertheless, once used as the basis for decision, both factual and
deliberative memorandums become available under the FOIA de-
spite the exemption. 139
Thus, according to the judicially developed standards, this ex-
emption can not shield IRS materials which are factual documents,
separable factual parts of documents containing pre-decisional pol-
icy and recommendations, documents containing adopted policy or
the rationale for adopted policy, guideline manuals for staff which
interpret or apply tax law or instruct staff members in procedure,
or documents applying law to a given case from requests for dis-
closure pursuant to the FOIA.
6. Law enforcement investigation files-The original language of
the FOIA exempted "investigatory files compiled for law en-
forcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a party
other than an agency" from disclosure. 140 This exemption was
successfully used by the IRS to block access to its information and
documents. In the course of the litigation leading to the Long
decision, a district court upheld nondisclosure of IRS files contain-
ing financial information pertaining to the taxpayer and affiliated
corporations which he controlled on the ground that the files were
investigatory and therefore shielded by this exemption."' In B &
C Tire Company v. Internal Revenue Service, 142 a corporation's
FOIA request for return of papers it had surrendered to the IRS in
the course of audit proceedings was denied on the ground that the
papers had become part of an investigatory file. In Williams v.
Internal Revenue Service,1 43 the District Court of Delaware de-
nied a request for production of an IRS agent's files containing
schedules, workpapers, and background data used in determining
the seeker's taxable income. 4 4 The court adopted the broad in-
terpretation that the original investigatory files exemption merely
prevented the existing federal discovery rights of litigants from
being implicitly overruled by the FOIA. The effect of the Williams
ruling was to deny use of the FOIA as a collateral method of civil
discovery,1 45 unless the files were not compiled for law enforce-
ment purposes. 1 46
139 Id. at 70; accord, Vaughn v. Rosen, 383 F. Supp. 1049, 1053-54 (D.D.C. 1974); Porter
County Chapter of Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission,
380 F. Supp. 630, 637 (N.D. Ind. 1974).
140 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1967), as amended Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 2(b) (Nov. 21, 1974).
See note 7 supra.
' Long v. IRS, 339 F. Supp. 1266, 1268 (W.D. Wash. 1971).
142 33 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 74-492 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
143 345 F. Supp. 591 (D. Del. 1972), affd, 479 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1973).
144 345 F. Supp. 591, 593.
145 Id. at 594. Cf. note 76 and accompanying text supra.
146 345 F. Supp. 591, 594.
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The Williams ruling followed one of the two approaches to the
original investigatory files exemption which had been taken by
federal courts. In several jurisdictions the original exemption was
viewed as merely affirming the independent right of a litigant to use
the federal discovery rules, therefore granting no greater access to
investigatory files than that which existed prior to the Act. 147 This
interpretation, consistent with Williams, was suggested by lan-
guage found only in the House report on the FOIA. 14 8 The in-
terpretation was criticized by the 1972 House subcommittee inves-
tigating agency compliance with the FOIA. 149 Moreover, the ma-
jority of decisions adopted the narrower reading that the original
exemption only prevented disclosure of records necessary for law
enforcement functions; thus the FOIA was viewed as authorizing
production of such materials when such production would not hin-
der law enforcement. 150 Since the purpose of the original inves-
tigatory files exemption was to protect the government's case in
court, administrative records and records of past actions were not
shielded. 5 1 An investigation begins when inquiry departs from the
routine and focuses on a particular party;152 therefore, the original
exemption did not apply to material which, while it may alert the
agency to a violation of law, was acquired essentially as a matter of
routine. 53 However, even this narrow reading of the original in-
vestigatory files exemption was subsequently broadened in scope.
Courts ruled that an agency did not need to show that adjudicatory
47 Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813, 817 (2d Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972);
Evans v. Department of Transportation, 446 F.2d 821, 824 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 918 (1972); Cowles Communications, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726,'
727 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
148 1965 H. REP. at I I states:
The [FOIA] is not intended to give a private party indirectly any earlier or
greater access to investigatory files than he would have directly in such litiga-
tion or proceedings.
The Senate report contains no language of this sort and arguably supports the narrower
construction of this exemption. 1965 S. REP. at 9. See note 76 sttpra. CF. text accompany-
ing notes 76-78 supra.
119 1972 H. REP. at 84.
'10 Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1971), stay denied, 404 U.S. 1204
(1971); Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21,25 (4th Cir. 1971); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067,
1080 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Bristol-Myers v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. HUD, 343 F. Supp. 1176,
1180 (E.D. Pa. 1972); M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467, 470 (D.D.C. 1972);
Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708, 711 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
1-1 Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 24 (4th Cir. 1971).
152 Center for National Policy Review v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 370, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
13 Id. at 373.
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proceedings were imminent, but only that the requested files were
compiled for inquiry into possible violations of law, 1 54 and that the
exemption was available even after enforcement proceedings are
terminated or no further proceedings are planned. 15 5 Courts re-
tained the requirement that substantial possibilities of law en-
forcement activity be anticipated by the agency undertaking the
investigation 156 and the requirement that the court determine for
itself whether the exemption properly applied rather than relying
upon the representations of the agencies. 157
Defenders of the broad scope given to the original investigatory
files exemption argued that the government must be allowed to
keep its investigatory procedures and techniques confidential. 158
The need to protect the privacy both of persons investigated 159 and
of persons giving testimony 160 was cited. It was argued that access
under federal discovery rules alone best protects the government's
ability to prove its case in court. 16 1 However, Congress has criti-
cized the broad interpretation of the original investigatory files
exemption, since it has prevented the FOIA from achieving its
intended scope. 162
The 1974 amendment to the FOIA replaced the original "to the
extent available by law" limitation on the investigatory files ex-
emption with an enumeration of six specific and exclusive types of
investigatory files which alone are exempt from disclosure. 6 3 The
change strikes down the ruling in Williams and other decisions 64
15' Id. at 373; Rural Housing Alliance v. Department of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 82
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
'1 Ditlow v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073. 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 238
(1974); Aspin v. Department of Defense, 491 F.2d 24, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Weisberg v.
Department of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993
(1974); contra, 1972 H. REP. at 84.
156 Rural Housing Alliance v. Department of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 82 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
,7Aspin v. Department of Justice, 491 F.2d 24. 29 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Weisberg v.
Department of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993
(1974).
,58 See, e.g., 1965 S. REP. at 3; Aspin v. Department of Defense, 491 F.2d 24, 29-30
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813, 817 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
889 (1972); Williams v. IRS, 345 F. Supp. 591, 594 (D.Del. 1972), aff d, 479 F.2d 317 (3d
Cir. 1973).
59 See 1965 S. REP. at 3; Evans v. Department of Transportation, 446 F.2d 821, 823 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972); Cowles Communications v. Department of
Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
160 See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 17667 (1964) (Remarks of Senator Humphrey).
161 Williams v. IRS, 345 F. Supp. 591, 594 (D. Del. 1972), affd, 479 F.2d 317 (3rd Cir.
1973).
162 1972 H. REP. at 84; Hearings on the Administration and Operation of the Freedom of
Information Act before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 6, 211-12 (1972).
,63 See note 7 supra; 1974 S. REP. at 6227.
'64 See notes 143-148 and accompanying text supra.
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that the FOIA grants no access to investigatory files in addition to
that available to litigants under discovery rules. 165 The new lan-
guage also restricts even the previous narrow reading of the inves-
tigatory files exemption adopted by most courts 166 to the six named
exemptions, 167 thus freeing routine scientific tests and
procedures 168 and, arguably, information files after contemplated
law enforcement efforts have ended as well. Since most IRS en-
forcement proceedings are civil rather than criminal, the identity of
IRS informants is protected by the new language, but the informa-
tion they furnish to the Service is disclosable. 169 Furthermore,
although IRS investigative procedures and techniques are pro-
tected from disclosure, those procedures and techniques which
constitute administrative staff manuals or instructions to staff that
affect a member of the public (the Manual and other guideline
documents of general applicability) remain subject to disclosure. 70
The IRS has objected to changes in the investigatory files exemp-
tion on the ground that they would create administrative burdens
and would hamper law enforcement efforts.' 7'
IV. CONCLUSION
The IRS has resisted the application of the FOIA to its materials
and files. However, courts are recognizing that lunder the FOIA
many IRS materials are subject to production upon request or to
public disclosure. Present interpretations of the FOIA suggest that
guidelines and policy materials of general applicability to members
of the public and applications of law to fact in particular cases (with
identifying data omitted) should be made available to the public
under the terms of the FOIA. This availability implements the
FOIA's purpose of avoiding secret federal agency law. Informa-
tion gathered or held by the IRS should be subject to production
upon demand, except the following types of information: (1) per-
sonal facts, disclosure of which would constitute invasion of pri-
165 See 1974 S. REP. at 6227.
166 See notes 150-157 and accompanying text supra.
161 See 1974 S. REP. at 6227.
168 Id.
'6 See 1974 S. REP. at 6227-28.
o See 1974 S. REP. at 6227-28.
171 General Counsel of the Treasury Report on S. 1142, 1973 Hearings 281-284; See
Koch, The Freedom of Information Act, Some Suggestions, 32 MD. L. REV. 189, 203-04
(1972).
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vacy (but not factual material which may be rendered anonymous
before release); (2) files relating to particular taxpayers and for use
in current litigation or law enforcement activity; (3) opinion and
policy materials relating to particular persons or issues not of gen-
eral applicability or which are pre-decisional recommendations; (4)
specific statutory protections. IRS efforts to make private letter
rulings and the Manual available to the public should be com-
mended. The implementation of the above-suggested standards for
disclosure would constitute a major advance in accomplishing the
congressional purpose of the Freedom of Information Act.
-Peter R. Spanos
